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George Ronald Wright
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and Cross-Respondent,
vs.
Westside Nursery, a Utah limited
partnership, and Darrel Humphries,
an individual,
Defendants and Respondents
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Dear Ms. Ray:
In response to your letter of January 26, 1989, please be advised
that there is no statutory or constitutional provision which is
dispositive of the central issues presented on this appeal.
We do rely upon the provisions
Procedure, in disposing of one
presented. We have set forth,
of that rule on page 47 of the

of Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil
of the collateral issues
verbatim, the relevant provision
brief.

I apologize for not outlining this material in a separate portion
of the brief as required by Rule 24. However, inasmuch as we do
not rely upon any provision other than that quoted on 47 of the
brief, I do not believe that there is any point in amending the
brief or modifying the addendum which has been previously
submitted.
I hope this letter adequately addresses the concerns which you
expressed in your letter of January 26, 1989. If additional
modifications need to be made please let me know.
Respectfully,

JQUA{QM#*>^Gary W. Pendleton
GWP:cch
cc: Hans Q. Chamberlain
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

]
]
]

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

]
Case No. 880544-CA
]

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled court
by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff initiated this action for the purpose of establishing the
enforceability and terms of a certain exchange agreement.

Defendants

counterclaimed seeking rescission of the contract and damages on a theory of
fraudulent misrepresentation. Defendant Humphries also sought damages for the
termination of his employment contract.

1

Prior to trial the district court summarily dismissed Defendants'
counterclaim to the extent that it sought rescission of the exchange agreement.
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on special interrogatories.
The jury concluded that both parties had breached the contracts and also found
Plaintiff guilty of fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the real estate conveyed
to Defendants as part of the exchange agreement.
Judgment was entered on the special verdict. Following the denial of
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial, Plaintiff filed this
appeal seeking reversal of the judgment awarding damages for fraudulent
misrepresentation and challenging other aspects of the proceedings and resulting
judgment.
Defendants cross-appealed seeking the entry of a judgment awarding
damages for wrongful termination of Defendant Humphries' employment contract
and seeking reversal of the judgment to the extent that it held Defendants
responsible for the payment of a certain promissory note executed in favor of a
third party, Zions Bank.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does the evidence support a finding that Plaintiff made any statement
of material fact concerning the value of the subject real property?
2. Is a statement of opinion regarding the value of real property
actionable as fraud?
3. Does the evidence support a finding that any statement made by
Plaintiff was false?
2

4

.• . • support

any

statement he made regarding the value of the subject real property was in fact
false?
5. Does the evidence support a finding that Plaintiff acted recklessly with
respect lo .111* ' '.l.itrinnnl 11 made legarding tl le value of the subject real property?
6. Does the evidence suppc^
cuncealed < 11 w 11i. id 11. il IL11 1 11 »«
l it

finding that Plaintiff fraudulently
1

•

the subject real property?

7 Is the principle which requires the elements of fraud to be proved by
clean 111111

)! ivii icii ig evidei X:M lelniMnl in (Ink 111 lining Ihe sufficiency ol the

evidence to support the jury's findings regarding fraud?
8 1 lid 11 if fiistiiir! 1'i 11 in mi ill in (IJSIIHJ in 111 .mm 1111* • jui y tl lat a good faith
expression of opinion regarding value is not actionable as fraud?
9 I) tl the iiiisiiMi! i coi'ji'l *J"'! in entering judgmei it 01 1 the verdict where it
clearly appeared that the jury had included as damages a hypothetical real estate
i nmnn^mn iivp<-'th"tiri'ii( u ^» *» >
i * * *» 1 t»y Defendant*

M|

U u • subsequent sale of the

subject property?
H" n • (Menda i Il" "i 1 ! 1 ! nr Hifillnl i . "n 'miindication where he refused
and failed to render an appropriate accounting?
11 I1- Defend; in! I (UIII,| liiri". enl'ilie I In luiiihirseiiieiil .il an,1 funds
borrowed from Zions First National Bank following the issuance and service of the
lemponin/ Resfivun'nfj (Met ani i

n

nli" tM M" v. 'Uatise dated Decernl.u

1985?

3

.J

12. Did the district court err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant
Humphries was entitled to indemnification or reimbursement of funds borrowed
from Zions First National Bank only if Defendant established that the funds were
actually used for the purpose of discharging Plaintiff's obligations, that the draw
was authorized by Plaintiff, and that the funds were not withdrawn in violation of an
order of the district court?
13. Are Defendants entitled to attorney's fees based upon contractual
stipulation where the majority of the contract claims were resolved in favor of
Plaintiff and against the Defendants?
14. Did the district court err in refusing to exonerate the injunction bond
filed by Transamerica Insurance Services where the previous rulings of the court
and the Special Verdict established the enforceability of the exchange agreement
and Plaintiff's right to the possession of the nursery and where there was never a
finding made or a judgment entered establishing that any temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction sought by Plaintiff was wrongfully issued?
15. Did the district court err in denying Plaintiff's motion for directed
verdict, Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and Plaintiff's
motion for new trial?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the sake of clarity, Plaintiff will be referred to as "Wright" and
Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery will be collectively referred to as
"Humphries" unless the context specifically requires a more exact designation of
the individual defendants.
4

THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
Wright and Humphries became acquainted in the early summer of 1985
when Humphries, as (JCIII'MI pditnn iiiinil iruiiHi|iM i if W*istsidt• H I U M I /,, ,/ns
landscaping Wright's residence in St. George.

In the weeks that followed they

developed a friendship as they began tn ( i s o is-: w» iqhVi \n '"ssibfe B< qui,i:ili«>"> «d"
the Westside Nursery. (1, 75-76, 409-411, 694-695)
Westside Nursery was a limited partnership with assets consistii ig c f
inventory (principally plant material), equipment and goodwill. (T. 73, 759-760,834)
The

partners included Darre

mphries

(45%), Ins Mthpr-in-lrwv

Barnes)(45%), and James LaVae Smith (10%)
No. 9)

The limited partnership owne<

(Gilbert

'2-75, 628; Defendant's Exhibit

•**

leased its bi jsiness

premises from James LaVae Smith. (T. 73)
Humphries'former partner, EdWootton, tincl fernntly" sold ins 4fS-pRrcenl
interest in the business for $20,500. (T. 71-72, 74-75)
Westside Nursery I lad suffered afinannnl loss each "I lhfj si-, y",ir, ii
had been in business with losses totaling $183,597. (I 78-79,258-262) The actual
negative cash flow in the business totaled $206,668. (1 258 262)
The local K-Mart store had recently opened a garden shop and three of
Humphries' competitors had recently gone < i ml I business

(T RF> B\ 4 17) Wi n jl il

was convinced that the business would be more successful if it would not compete
directly with K-Mart and similar establishments and instead offered (tun! niRlcri.il
which was considered exotic or unusual in the St. George area. (T. 86-90, 411
418)

5

Despite prolonged negotiations the parties could not come to terms
regarding the value of the nursery business. (T. 81-84,415-416, 432-433, 701-702,
710-711) Wright made it clear that he was interested only in acquiring the plant
material and that the other purported assets of the nursery were of no value to him.
(T. 658-659, 759-760, 834, 1026)
The parties began to negotiate the transaction in terms of an exchange
involving a portion of a 22-acre tract Wright owned in Weber County. (T. 419)
Wright explained the reason for approaching the transaction as an exchange of
properties:
Q. Okay. Were there any other reasons why you didn't determine the
value?
A. Yes. Because every time we approached the price, Darrel and I
suddenly were into disagreement. If we were - as soon as we began
to say - interpret or exchange ideas in terms of price as opposed to
value, the negotiations broke down and did so early on at my home.
And therefore, it was our suggestion that we involve ourself in a trade
with enough inherent elasticity on either side to accommodate either
party. Whether his inventory ended up being $28,000 or $35,000 or
40 or more was not what I was bargaining for, I was bargaining for
the inventory. Whether my land turned out to be 28,000 or 35 or 40
was not what he was bargaining for. He was bargaining for those
two acres1 of land that had the excellent prospect of being developed
along with my own property.
(T. 432-433)
Humphries traveled to Weber County at Wright's expense in August,
1985. He denied having seen the property on that occasion. (T. 81-83, 428-429,
674-675, 699-701)

Initially Wright contemplated trading only two acres for the nursery inventory. Ultimately three
acres were conveyed to Humphries as part of the exchange. (T. 419, 759)

6

On October 3, 1985, the parties traveled to Weber County for the
purpose of negotiating the exchange. (T. 91-99, 215-217, 758) They spent the
night in Wright's home near the 22-acre parcel. The next morning they spent more
than four hours reviewing and revising the drafts of two written agreements which
had been prepared by Wright's attorney, Timothy B. Anderson. (T. 94, 420, 435,
711-712) The first agreement related to the exchange agreement involving the real
estate and the nursery. (Addendum A; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) The second was
an agreement relating to Humphries' employment as Wright's nursery manager.
(Addendum B; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2)
The parties specifically discussed and included in the written contract
provisions relating to the payment of a certain promissory note which Humphries
had executed in favor of Zions First National Bank on January 3, 1985. (T. 366367, 477-479)

Wright's position throughout the litigation would be that it was

Humphries' obligation to pay and discharge this note while Humphries would take
the position that Wright had agreed to assume it. (R. vol.IV, pp. 19-20)
There is some conflict in the evidence concerning whether the
agreements were signed before or after the parties and their wives viewed the
property which was to be conveyed in exchange for the nursery assets.2 (T. 952

In relating the events surrounding the inspection of the property, Mrs. Humphries stated:
Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Were you a participant in any of the conversations
between Darrel and Ron Wright where the value of the property to be exchanged
was discussed?
A. Not in the conferences they had.
Q. Were you on another occasion?
A. When we were in the vehicle of the car driving around that afternoon looking at
property. Because I kept nudging Darrel and saying, "Where are we going and

7

96) Regardless of the exact chronology of events, it is apparent that Humphries
voiced no objection to the exchange when he viewed the property on October 4,
1985.
Wright's 22-acre tract is located south of Ogden and approximately 1.6
miles from Interstate 15. (T. 422) It has easy access to the Interstate via Combe
Road to Harrison Boulevard, a major artery. (T. 424)
The property is located south and west of Combe Road and is relatively
level, the elevation dropping only approximately 10 feet in the 1600-foot length of
the property. (T. 97-98, 426) The property is covered with tall grasses and there
are numerous trees in the northerlymost portion which was conveyed to
Humphries as a part of the subject transaction. (T. 97-100, 426, 447, 949)
Humphries acknowledged the parcel's striking aesthetic appeal. (T. 97-98)
The property is bordered on the west and south by residential
subdivisions which have developed into middle- to upper-income neighborhoods
where there exists good pride of ownership. A public school and LDS chapel are
located in the immediate vicinity and streets are paved to the subject property. (T.
435-439, 471-472, 938-939, 947)
The adjacent property located north and west of Combe Road is heavily
wooded and ascends to a bench. (T. 425-426)
Wright had acquired the 22-acre tract in 1957 in connection with the

what are we doing?"
And he said, "We are going to go look at some property we are thinking of trading
for the nursery."
(T. 674)
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acquisition of approximately 350 acres. (T. 425) As the parties approached the
property on October 4, 1985, he outlined its history for Humphries and his wife.
Wright related the terms of numerous land sales which he had made in the area
and pointed out the locations of these properties. A summary of the testimony
regarding neighboring properties is attached hereto as Addendum C-2.3
No evidence was introduced which would indicate that Wright had
recently obtained an appraisal of the property which he proposed to convey to
Humphries and Wright never represented that the property had recently been
appraised. Wright did, however, disclose the fact that he had recently mortgaged
5.93 acres located in the southeasterly end of the 22-acre tract to Sun Capital
Bank which had loaned him $20,000 per acre. (T. 589-590, 597-600, 661-665;
Defendant's Exhibit No. 32)
Humphries conceded that Wright was not obligated to provide an
appraisal as a part of their agreement and that he was satisfied with Wright's
opinion regarding the value. (T. 134-137, 735)
At trial Humphries admitted several times that nothing that Wright told
him regarding transactions involving the neighboring properties was false. (T. 137138, 449-452, 689-690, 775-778)
As the parties walked the property, Wright disclosed the fact that there
was no sewer currently servicing the area. (T. 109-111, 436, 715) The homes in
neighboring subdivision were on septic tanks. (T. 111)

Wright indicated to

Addendum C-1 is a reproduction of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5. Addendum C-2 is a reproduction
of the same exhibit upon which figures regarding the sales prices or mortgage values of the
neighboring properties have been superimposed together with supporting references to the record.

9

Humphries that he expected sewer to be on line within a year to a year and a half
and that he intended to develop the property once the sewer was available. (T.
110-111,715)
Several options for developing the land were discussed. These included
merely holding the property as an investment, developing the property as a
separate subdivision, and waiting and developing the property with Wright once
sewer was available. (T- 97-98, 106-108, 112-113, 436-438, 594-595, 715-716)
Humphries recalls some of these conversations:
And that there would be a sewer ~ something to do with the sewer
would be coming to the property within the next year to year and a
half, but if I wanted to develop the ground with him prior to that point,
I could. He would show me how to develop it because he said, "I
know all the tricks.
I'm a developer.
However, it is my
recommendation that you wait, and we will develop this together in
a year and a half down the road."

0"- 715)
Humphries and his wife both claim that Wright stated the subject three
acres was worth $30,000 an acre. Humphries testified:
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And could you tell the jury what was said
in the automobile about the value of this particular piece of property.
A. The exact words, I do not recall. Mr. Wright implied to both of us
that the value of the property would be worth $30,000 per acre.
Q. He implied that?
A. From the best of my recollection, that's correct. When I say
"implied," let me restate that. "You will find the value of this particular
property to be worth $30,000 an acre."
(T. 774-775)

10

Once the agreements were signed, the parties went to Great Basin
Engineering and then on to a local title company where the deeds were prepared.
(T. 719-720) The same day, two deeds were executed and recorded conveying
the northwesterly most three acres of the 22-acre tract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 50
and 51)

Humphries and his wife were, at their request, designated as the

grantees. (T. 481-482)
Upon returning to St. George, Humphries continued in his position as
manager of Westside Nursery pursuant to the terms of the management
agreement which the parties had executed. (T. 121-122,752-754) Under the terms
of this agreement Humphries' salary was established at the sum of $2500 per
month. (Addendum B) He had been withdrawing a salary of only $1000 per month
prior to the exchange and his salary as Wright's manager was established with the
understanding that Humphries would be responsible for his own taxes and
insurance. (Addendum B; T. 80)
In early October 1985, Wright began to implement his vision of the future
of the nursery business. (T. 490-491, 687)

In this undertaking he invested

approximately $60,000 in the business during the following two months. p~. 490492)
THE CONTROVERSY
Sometime between the execution of the agreements and Thanksgiving
1985, Gilbert Barnes wanted Humphries to have the Weber County property
appraised. (T. 134)
Shortly thereafter one Chad Eskelsen contacted Humphries and began
11

to communicate to him rumors concerning Wright's alleged lack of integrity. (T.
1015-1016) Humphries became concerned about the value of the property in
Weber County and after a cursory investigation concluded that he had been
defrauded. (T. 739-741)
Humphries contacted Wright and demanded copies of the agreements.
When he learned that Wright had gone into town for the purpose of making
photocopies, Humphries took one of Wright's employees with him and literally
assaulted Wright when they located him at the Washington County Library. Once
Humphries had stripped them from Wright's hands he then gave the documents
to the nursery employee who immediately left the area. (T. 139-143, 493-498) This
incident occurred on December 5,1985. Thereafter, Wright never returned to the
nursery until he was given possession of the business by court order in March
1986. (T. 500-501)
On December 10, 1985, Humphries signed a second promissory note
in favor of Zions Bank in the amount of $30,000. (T. 991-992; Defendant's Exhibit
No. 20)
On the same day, Humphries retained an attorney, Hans Q.
Chamberlain, with a $500 check drawn on Wright's nursery account. (T. 145-146;
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 53) Chamberlain immediately wrote a letter to Wright advising
him that Humphries had reason to believe that the Weber County property had
been misrepresented and that Wright had fraudulently concealed an impending
building moratorium. The letter indicated that Humphries was willing to confirm the
contracts and remain at the nursery as Wright's manager if Wright would

12

immediately pay the $15,000 note to Zions Bank and deposit sufficient funds in the
nursery bank account to cover existing overdrafts.4 (T. 801-806, 815-818;
Defendant's Exhibit No. 69)
On December 13, Humphries drew $15,000 against the $30,000 note
which he had executed on December 10. These funds were deposited in the
nursery account. (T. 991-992)
On December 18,1985, Chamberlain again wrote to Wright announcing
that as a result of Wright's failure to comply with the demands of the December 10
letter, Humphries had repudiated and rescinded the written contracts. (Defendant's
Exhibit No. 75)
THE LITIGATION BEGINS
On December 23 Wright, by and through his attorney, Timothy B.
Anderson, initiated this action for the purpose of establishing his ownership of the
nursery business and his right to the possession thereof. (R. vol.I, pp. 1-21A) On
the same day the district court issued a temporary restraining order which, among
other things, prohibited Humphries from incurring any further indebtedness in
Wright's behalf or in behalf of Westside Nursery. (Addendum D; Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 3) A copy of this order was served on Humphries on December 26. This
order was extended from time to time by stipulation of counsel until a hearing on

The jury would eventually decide that the $15,000 note was Humphries' obligation and its
findings would further demonstrate that the overdrafts would not have occurred but for Humphries'
misappropriation of nursery account funds to his own use and his failure to reimburse the nursery
account for the payment of obligations which he was to assume and discharge under the terms of
the written agreements. (R. vol.IV, pp. 143-146)
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the temporary possession of the nursery was conducted in March 1986. (T. 149151, 365, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3)
On December 30, 1985, Humphries drew an additional $5,000 against
the $30,000 note at Zions Bank. On January 8, 1986, he took another $10,000
draw. Both draws were deposited in the nursery account. (T. 991-992)
Between December 1985 and March 1986, Humphries consistently
repudiated the contracts, took the position that he was the owner of Westside
Nursery and that the exchange and management agreements had been rescinded.
(T. 186-187, 806-809) In his own words:5
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON]
understand the question.

"MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I'm not sure I

"MR. ANDERSON: I asked him if he told Mr. Smith or
represented to him that he owned the nursery, rather
than Mr. Wright, at this point.
"THE WITNESS: Well, I think -- hey, I don't know. I
could have, Tim. I could have. I haven't the slightest
idea.
If you're asking me in my opinion who owns the
nursery, as far as I'm concerned, I own the nursery flat
out. No question about it in my mind at all. I own
Westside Nursery."
Was that your statement on that occasion?
A. Yes. That was my statement as of March the 11th, at that
particular day. Because I had not been paid from Mr. Wright.
0". 808-809)
Following a hearing which was concluded on March 19,1986, the district

5

The quoted language is from Darrel Humphries' deposition of March 11,1986, regarding which
he was questioned at trial.

14

court awarded Wright possession of the nursery pending adjudication on the
merits and appointed John L Miles, attorney-at-law and certified public accountant,
to act as receiver. Wright, by order of the court, was required and did post an
injunction bond in the amount of $50,000 as a condition to his court-ordered
possession of the nursery pending trial. (R. vol.1, pp. 303-305)

The annual

premium on this bond is $1000. (T. 508)
Wright promptly discharged Humphries. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 29)
Humphries demanded and was eventually paid the salary he claimed for services
rendered from January through March 1986. (T. 810)
As court-appointed receiver, Miles took possession of the business
records and requested the assistance of both parties in performing the duties
imposed upon him by the court's order. (T. 249-250)
On March 31, 1986, Humphries answered Wright's Complaint and
counterclaimed seeking, among other things, rescission of the exchange
agreement and damages for fraud. Humphries specifically alleged the following
misrepresentations:
A. That the real property to be conveyed had a fair market
value in the sum of $90,000.
B. That the real property to be conveyed was free and clear
of all taxes and encumbrances.
C. That the real property could be developed immediately, and
that there were no restrictions prohibiting development.
D. That the real property would be conveyed to Westside
Nursery, a Utah limited partnership.
E. That the real property to be conveyed was the property
viewed jointly by Wright and Defendants, and represented by Wright
as the parcel having numerous trees located upon the same, thus
enhancing its developmental potential.
(R. vol.ll.p. 11)
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Humphries also sought $15,000 in damages for termination of his
employment contract (R. vol.II, pp. 15-16)
On September 17, 1986, the matter came on for hearing on several
pending motions. Following that hearing, the district court made specific findings
of fact which included the following:
1. Defendants accepted certain benefits of the October 4,1985
Agreement for Purchase of Assets and Contract for
Management Services, specifically, (A) A position as manager
of the West Side Nursery from October 4, 1985, until plaintiff
Wright obtained possession of the premises by order of the
Court on March 25, 1986; (B) Payment of $7,500 for
managerial services for the months of January, February and
March, 1986, during which time control of the nursery
premises was in dispute; (C) Managerial compensation as
manager for the months of October, November and
December, 1985; (D) Monthly payment to defendant
Humphries of a ten per cent (10%) surcharge over and above
the regular rental payment from defendant Humphries to the
lessor of the Westside Nursery property resulting in payment
of over $2,352.00 to defendant Humphries by plaintiff Wright
since October 4, 1985; (E) Assumtion [sic] by plaintiff Wright
of the miscellaneous trade accounts of not more than
$5000.00, as setforth in paragraph 2 E of the Agreement for
Purchase of Assets; (F) Regular and timely monthly rental
payment on the West Side Nursery premises to Landlord
pursuant to the terms of paragraph 8 of the Puchase [sic] of
Assets Agreement.
2. Defendant Humphries has received no managerial fee since
the business changed possession on March 25, 1986. His
right to managerial compensation after that date remains an
issue of dispute between the parties.
3. Acceptance of the benefits under the Purchase of Assets
Agreement and the Contract for Management Agreement
shows an affirmation of sufficient terms of the purchase and
sale of the nursery that defendants have waived their rights to
seek recision [sic] of the Purchase of Assets Agreement and
is further estopped from seeking such relief.
4. Defendants have received real property in Ogden, Utah,
pursuant to the Agreement for Purchase of Assets and has

16

listed the same for sale by a licensed real estate broker.
5. Adequate remedies are available at law to satisfy
defendant's claims herein.
* *

*

Based upon these findings the district court made the following orders:
1. Defendants' Counterclaim as to their first Cause of Action
for Recision [sic] shall be and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
2. Defendants' Fifth Affirmative Defense based on the theory
of recision [sic] is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Any and all defenses or causes of action by defendants
herein seeking relief under the legal theory of recision [sic] are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
* *

*

(R. vol.ll, pp. 258-262)
Miles provided his report to the court on November 11, 1986, and was
released from any further obligation to act as receiver. (R. vol.ll, pp. 258-262)
Humphries never again viewed the Weber County property after he
acquired it on October 4, 1985. (T. 100-101) As Humphries explained it:
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And you've never gone back up there
since you started this lawsuit to evaluate that property?
A. No. Because I have no authority to evaluate it. I wouldn't know
if it was worth $100,000 or 10 million dollars.
(T. 101)
He listed it for sale, and notwithstanding the fact that he was engaged
in a lawsuit wherein he was contending the property was virtually worthless, he
was able to sell it to a neighboring landowner for $54,700 approximately one
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month before trial. (T. 840-841, 862-863; Defendant's Exhibit No. 34)
Meanwhile, Wright continued his development of the portion of the
property he had retained and eventually obtained approval of its subdivision.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6)
While in possession of the business Darrel Humphries paid several of his
personal obligations through checks drawn on Wright's nursery account.

In

addition to retaining Mr. Chamberlain by use of this account, Darrel Humphries
paid pre-October 1985 taxes and accounts payable; paid $5,544.75 against the
obligations incurred in the purchase of his personal vehicles; paid his personal
health insurance premiums; and paid a $900 check to Ogden Appraisal, all with
checks drawn on Wright's nursery account.

(T. 145-147, 152-161, 227-229;

Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 53, 54, 55, 57, and 58)
THE TRIAL
The matter was tried to a jury beginning on April 25,1988.
Wright presented evidence for the purpose of establishing that he had
not contracted to assume the January 1985 note at Zions Bank. (T. 366-367, 477479)
The evidence at trial clearly established that Humphries, while employed
as Wright's nursery manager, had misappropriated money to his own use (T. 145147,152-161, 227-229; Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 53, 54, 55, 57, and 58); that he had
borrowed funds from Zions Bank without authorization and in violation of the
restraining order (T. 511, 520-522, 526, 665-666); and that the need to borrow
money

for

business

purposes

was
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necessitated

only

by

Humphries'

misappropriation of funds (T. 783-799, 858).
Finally, Wright sought to establish that Humphries had failed to provide
an adequate accounting and was therefore not entitled to reimbursement of any
of the funds which he had borrowed and deposited in the nursery account
following Wright's ouster.
Miles, the court-appointed receiver, testified that Humphries had failed
to keep adequate business records. (T. 312-314) Specifically Miles testified that
Humphries had failed to keep records from which the accounts receivable could
be accurately reconstructed. (T. 251-252) Humphries' accountant, Grant Tucker,
testified that ledgers containing that information existed. (T. 888) These ledgers
were never produced for the receiver.
Miles also testified that Humphries had told him that no inventory had
been taken in October 1985. Humphries failed to produce any such inventory for
the receiver. (T. 318-320)

Despite Miles' requests, Humphries also failed to

provide a per-unit price which would enable the receiver to evaluate the physical
inventory taken March 25, 1986. (T. 302-305)
Finally, Miles testified that the nursery accounts payable increased from
$11,772.86 on October 4, 1985 to $50,492.60 when Wright regained possession
of the business by court order on March 25, 1986. (T. 255-257)
Humphries then proceeded with proof on his counterclaim of fraudulent
misrepresentation. Part of the evidence offered in support of that claim has been
summarized earlier in this portion of the brief ("THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS").
The thrust of Humphries' counterclaim lies in Wright's alleged statements

19

concerning the value of the subject land and the fact that on October 15,1985, the
Weber County commission declared a limited moratorium on all land lying within
Uintah-Highlands Water and Sewer District. (Addendum E; Defendant's Exhibit No.
27)
The sewer servicing the subject property was completed and on line by
July or August 1987. (T. 937, 975) Furthermore, the evidence clearly established
that the subject property would have met the requirements of the limited
moratorium and qualified for immediate development without the sewer. (T. 928930, 980) Humphries' appraiser testified:
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And, in fact, in your report, Mr. Schwartz - you report that Mr. Schwartz [Weber County Health Department]
indicated that in his opinion, percolation tests and other tests would
prove positive, and building permits could be obtained?
A. [BY MR. LESTER S. FROERER] Yes. Absolutely.
Q. And then you talked to Mr. Jay Anderson at the engineering office.
Mr. Anderson had the same opinion about the perc tests on the
subject property?
A. Right.
(T. 930)
Humphries attempted to establish fraud arising out of Wright's alleged
failure to disclose the impending limited moratorium in the area. The only proof
regarding Wright's knowledge of any pending moratorium is found in Wright's own
testimony.

He testified that he was contemplating the subdivision and

development of his 22-acre tract and had approached officials of Weber County
and the Uintah-Highland Water and Sewer District. He was advised that there had
been complaints about ground water contamination in the area. He was also
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advised by a deputy Weber County attorney that the health concerns that were
being expressed were not of sufficient magnitude to justify further governmental
regulation of the development of the property. (T. 496-498, 551-567)
Humphries' appraiser, using a developmental approach to value, testified
that in his opinion the subject three acres had a value of $64,000 on October 4,
1985.6 Under his first scenario, Froerer assumed that the property would pass
required percolation tests and would qualify for development without the sewer.
Froerer's opinion also assumed that the property would be divided into four
building lots which could be sold for $24,000 each. After subtracting the direct
costs of development and indirect costs such as interest and sales commissions,
he calculated the net sales proceeds to be $69,900 which he reduced to "present
worth" by applying a discount rate of 12 percent. (T. 906-914)
Froerer was also allowed to state an opinion regarding value based
upon a second scenario in which he assumed that the property would not qualify
for development until the sewer was on line and that the sewer would not be
available to the property for a period of five years. The greatest variable in this
formula was the reduction to present worth based upon the five-year delay in
development. Under this scenario his opinion of value was $35,000. (T. 918)
Wright called an appraiser by the name of Wib Cook who testified, using
a market analysis approach, that in his opinion the property had a value of $84,000
on the date of his appraisal in July 1986. He also testified that in his opinion the
value would have been substantially the same on the date of the transaction,

6

This opinion was in fact based upon an appraisal of 2.81 acres. (T. 940-942)
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October 4, 1985. (T. 962-972)
Cook testified that part of his initial investigation of the property included
an examination of tax records which indicated that the subject three acres was
valued at $134,860 for property tax purposes and its assessed value was
$104,688. (T. 968)
During the course of the trial questions were raised concerning the value
of the inventory which Wright received through the subject exchange. Humphries
testified that he and an employee named Phil Tyler had inventoried the nursery
property immediately prior to the exchange. Based on that inventory and in the
course of their negotiations, Humphries advised Wright that the inventory had a
value of $60,000. (T. 759-771,779-780) In fact, the written inventory in Humphries'
possession totaled only $45,911.90. (T. 779-780)
Humphries nevertheless insisted that he believed the inventory to be
worth $60,000 and further introduced testimony indicating that he had mistakenly
understated its value at the time the trade was negotiated. (T. 759-771)
In support of his claim for indemnification Humphries sought to justify
borrowing additional funds from Zions Bank on the basis that he was not
obligating Wright or Westside Nursery but borrowed the funds in his personal
capacity. (T. 373-374)
Following the presentation of all the evidence, Wright moved for a
directed verdict against Humphries on the issues of fraud and indemnification.
These motions were denied and the case was submitted to the jury by special
verdict. (T. 1050-1056)
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THE VERDICT
The jury determined that the $15,000 note executed by Humphries in
favor of Zions Bank on January 3, 1985, was Humphries' responsibility and that
Wright had not contracted to assume the obligation. (Addendum F; R. vol. IV,
pp. 143-146)
The jury also found that Wright was entitled to the accounts receivable
owed Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985, and that Humphries had
misappropriated $6,805 of Wright's money for his personal use. Humphries was
held responsible to pay the accounts payable as of October 4,1985, to the extent
that said accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000. (R. vol.lV, p. 144)

In so

concluding it was established that Humphries had used $6,772 of Wright's money
to service accounts payable which Humphries should have paid. (R. vol.lV, pp. 143146; T. 1146-1147)
The jury concluded that Wright should be required to reimburse
Humphries the funds he had borrowed and deposited in the nursery account
following Humphries' repudiation of the exchange contract. (R. vol.lV, pp.144-145)
The jury found that both parties had breached the agreements and that
Humphries had been damaged in the amount of $15,000 as a result of his
termination as Wright's nursery manager and should recover $10,000 in attorney's
fees. (R. vol.lV, pp. 143-146)
On the fraud issue, the jury by a 6-to-2 verdict concluded that Wright
had made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the value of the Weber
County property. The jury then concluded that Humphries should be awarded
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$38,582 in damages. This figure was calculated by beginning with the sum of
$90,000 and subtracting therefrom $54,700 which was the price obtained by
Humphries in the subsequent sale of the property. The jury then added the sum
of $3,282 which was in fact a hypothetical six percent real estate commission
which the jury assumed was includable as an element of damages.7 (R. vol.IV,
p.145;T. 1147)

POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Following the rendition of the verdict, Wright moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issues of fraud
and indemnification. (R. vol.IV, pp.147-149)
Wright also argued that the application of well-established principles of
law to the jury's findings should result in the entry of a judgment of no cause of
action on Humphries' claim for wrongful termination. Alternatively, Wright moved

The jury understood the testimony relating to Mr. Froerer's developmental approach to value
to indicate that a real estate commission was to be included as an element of damages. Note the
foreman's response to the court's questioning:
THE COURT: All right. And the other area I'm wondering about is the $38,582 for - under the fraud complaint.
What was the basis of that award?
[THE FOREMAN]: We subtracted from the sale price of the home, the price that
the seller would have received. I think one of the appraisers stated that the real
estate fee was 6 percent, which we thought was low, but that's what we used. We
subtracted that from the $54,000 and subtracted that from the $90,000, which was
claimed as the value of the property.
THE COURT: So it was based on the $90,000 representation and the actual sale
price of the property principal minus the real estate fee?
[THE FOREMAN]: The actual sale price less the commission price.
(T. 1147)
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for a new trial on the issue of wrongful termination in the event the court were to
determine that the jury's findings mandated a verdict in Humphries' favor on that
issue. (R. vol.IV, pp. 147-149)
Finally, Wright moved for exoneration of the injunction bond filed when
he took possession of the nursery under court order in March 1986. This motion
was made on the grounds that the evidence established and the court had
previously ruled that Wright was entitled to the possession of the nursery.
Consequently no finding had been made or judgment entered supporting a
conclusion that the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction had been
wrongfully issued. (R. vol. IV, pp. 185-193)
The district court concluded that the evidence did not justify a verdict in
Humphries' favor on the wrongful termination claim and further concluded that an
application of the law to the jury's findings established Wright's justification in
terminating Humphries' employment. (Transcript of July 12,1988, hearing pp. 1011)
The district court denied Wright's motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for new trial on the issues of fraud and indemnification and also
denied Wright's motion to exonerate the injunction bond. (R. vol.IV, pp.249251)
Judgment was entered on the verdict and this appeal was prosecuted
from that judgment and from the court's denial of Wright's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and exoneration of the injunction bond.
(Addendum G; R. vol.IV, pp.240-248, 252-253)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Humphries failed to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent
misrepresentation.

Statements regarding value are not as a general rule

actionable as fraud and the facts of this case do not bring it within any of the
recognized exceptions to this rule.
Even if an opinion regarding the value of the subject property is deemed
actionable, the evidence fails to establish that Wright made any statement
recklessly or with knowledge that it was false.
Humphries failed to keep or provide business records which would
facilitate an adequate accounting of his management of the nursery business and
should accordingly be denied indemnification. Furthermore, the district court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury concerning the elements and burden of proof which
Humphries was required to establish and carry in order to sustain his claim for
indemnification.
Humphries failed to establish entitlement to any contractual remedy and
is therefore not entitled to recover attorney's fees.
Finally, Humphries suffered no loss resulting from the issuance of the
order giving Wright possession of the nursery and the injunction bond should be
exonerated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HUMPHRIES FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION.
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A.
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD
The elements of fraud and deceit are well established in the law of this
jurisdiction. Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 144, 247 P.2d 273 (1952) remains the
leading case and outlines the nine elements of actionable fraud. They include the
following:
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that
the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his
injury and damage.
122 Utah at 144-145.
B.

STATEMENTS REGARDING VALUE AS FRAUD.
1. GENERAL RULE
It is a well-settled general rule that representations regarding the value
of real property are ordinarily to be regarded only as mere expressions of opinion
and do not constitute fraud. See generally 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit.
Sections 112, 113, 119, and 122 (citing authority from the vast majority of the
American jurisdictions).
In commenting on the basis for the general rule, American
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, reads as follows:
The general rule that fraud cannot be predicated on representations
as to value is based on the fact that value is largely a matter of
judgment and estimation, about which men may differ, and it is
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therefore unlikely that any statement as to value was material in the
sense that it was an inducing cause of a transaction. Such
representations can rarely have induced the other party to enter into
the contract without negligence on his part. It has been declared that
the extent of supply and demand relative to an article of commerce,
upon which its value principally depends, is in a great measure a
matter of opinion, upon which different minds may form different
conclusions; to deprive the better informed, more enterprising, and
more cautious party of the benefit of his contract, on account of
representations, the correctness of which the other party ought to
judge for himself, would tend more to encourage ignorance, sloth,
and recklessness than to repress dishonesty. The law does not deny
its aid in such case because it looks with indulgence upon a want of
candor and sincerity, but because it will not encourage that indolence
and inattention which are no less pernicious to the interest of society,
and will not relieve those who suffer damage by reason of their own
negligence or folly.
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 113 (1968).
The Utah case which appears to be most directly on point is Baird v.
Eflow Ivn. Co.. 76 Utah 232, 289 P. 112 (1930). In that case the plaintiff sought
rescission of a contract involving the exchange of real property claiming that he
had been fraudulently induced to trade his ranch, which he valued at $50,000, for
the defendant's interest in the Prescott apartments in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff
complained that the value of the apartment building had been represented to be
$125,000, subject to an indebtedness in the amount of $75,000. At trial, plaintiff
produced evidence that the apartment building was only worth $82,000 while
defendants produced testimony indicating its value at somewhere between $95,000
and $125,000. At the close of the case, the court refused to submit the matter to
the jury for determination and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appealed.
After concluding that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of an
alleged misrepresentation regarding actual rents generated in connection with the
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operation of the apartment building, the Utah Supreme Court turned its attention
to the issue of whether or not a fraud claim could be maintained where the
allegations of misrepresentation are limited to opinions of value in the absence of
proof of any misrepresentation regarding any specific fact upon which an opinion
of value would likely be based. In affirming the judgment of dismissal, the Court
announced its adherence to the general rule:
It is the general rule that misrepresentations as to value do not
ordinarily constitute fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions
of opinion or "trader's talk" involving matter of judgment and
estimation as to which men may differ. [Citations omitted]
76 Utah at 238.
In Chaneyv. Cahill. (App) 11 Ohio L Abs. 472 (1931), the plaintiff traded
his 200-acre farm for a brick business property in the city of Columbus, Ohio.
Concluding that he had been defrauded he abandoned the property, refused to
receive the rent and brought suit to set aside the transaction. He alleged that the
Columbus property was represented to him as being worth $30,000 to $35,000
when in fact it was not worth over $15,000 and that the existing leases on the brick
business property had been made for the purpose of inducing the transaction,
were not in good faith, and did not reflect the true rental value of the property.
The Ohio court concluded that there was no evidence that the rental
value of the city property had been misrepresented and then addressed the issue
of the disparity in the values assigned to the property:
While it appears that Chaney has suffered considerable property loss
by reason of the trade, it is such a loss as frequently happens where
parties are dealing in property with which they are unfamiliar. Chaney
was a farmer and when he undertook to deal in city property he was
probably out of his business element. Cahill had the right to place
such value on his property as he desired.
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11 Ohio L Abs. at 473.
Plaintiff's petition for rescission was dismissed.
The Court's attention is directed to the recent case of Poison Co. v.
Imperial Cattle Co.. Mont., 624 P.2d 993 (1981). In Poison, the defendant had
become obligated to the plaintiff for the sum of approximately $142,000. Following
lengthy negotiations, the amount of the obligation was liquidated at $55,000.
Pefendant owned certain property which he represented to be commercial
property located in "downtown" Kalispell, Montana. This property was to provide
security for the payment of the agreed settlement. Plaintiff was to receive a copy
of the property description, title insurance, and a copy of the recent appraisal
which defendants had allegedly obtained indicating that the Kalispell property had
a market value of $45,000.
Thereafter negotiations continued by phone and correspondence and
approximately three months later plaintiff agreed to accept the Kalispell property
in payment of $45,000 of the $55,000 settlement. A warranty deed was tendered
and accepted notwithstanding the fact that the property had never been identified
for plaintiff.
Plaintiff then traveled to Kalispell where he contacted a local realtor for
the purpose of listing his newly-acquired property. At that time plaintiff discovered
that the property consisted of slightly over one acre of undeveloped ground
situated directly between a Pacific Power and Light substation and the railroad
tracks. While there was a narrow corridor leading from the public street along and
behind the substation to the subject property, the property itself had no frontage
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on any public road. Furthermore, there existed substantial questions regarding
legally enforceable access to the property. At its closest point, the property was
a distance of five blocks from downtown Kalispell.
Plaintiff engaged an MAI appraiser who appraised the parcel at between
$1,250 and $8,900, depending upon the resolution of uncertainties regarding
access.
Plaintiff initiated an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and from an
adverse judgment appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana which affirmed the
trial court noting:
This Court has long adhered to the rule that statements of opinion are
pre-eminently subject to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.
[Citation omitted] Statements as to the value of property are
generally considered declarations of opinion and will not constitute
a proper basis for rescission. [Citation omitted]
*

*

*

The common law provides reasonable protection to purchasers
against fraud and deceit. However, it does not go to the romantic
length of offering indemnity against the adverse consequences of
folly and indolence or a careless indifference to information which
would enlighten the purchaser as to the truth or falsity of the seller's
assertions as to value. In such an instance, every person reposes
at his own peril in the face of another's opinion when he has ample
opportunity to exercise informed judgment. [Citation omitted]
624 P.2d at 996.
Other courts have even gone further in denying relief based upon
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation of the value of land.

In Eaton v.

Sontag. 387 A.2d 33 (Maine 1978), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reaffirmed
a precedent which had been the law of Maine for over 100 years when it
announced that "misrepresentations as to value and quality of land made by the
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vendor, even though made with fraudulent intent, are not actionable." 387 A.2d at
37. See generally Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 53 (1968).
While the court noted that the result would likely be different had a
misrepresentation of any material fact reflecting upon the value had been made,
where the only alleged misrepresentations were opinions of value and general
statements regarding the quality of the real estate, relief would be denied. It is also
noted that in Eaton, past association between vendors and purchasers as social
friends for 15 years did not establish a confidential relationship which would have
required a higher standard of conduct.
In Frazier v. Southwest Sav. and Loan Ass'n.. 134 Ariz. 12,653 P.2d 362
(1982), the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against defendant
Southwest Savings and Loan Association entered upon a jury verdict and
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of
Southwest.
Southwest had made a loan secured by 68 lots in a certain subdivision
located in Scottsdale, Arizona. Later plaintiff became interested in trading some
unmounted gems for the equity in the subdivision. When the parties met to
discuss the proposed exchange, Southwest's vice president attended for the
purpose of obtaining information necessary to qualify plaintiff to take over the loan
on the subdivision. During the meeting the owners of the subdivision apparently
made misrepresentations concerning the status of the subdivision and the required
municipal and state approval. Southwest did not make any misrepresentations
concerning governmental approval of the subdivision but had appraised the
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property st $1,020,000.
Plaintiff then entered into a contract to purchase the subdivision following
which he attempted, through his real estate agent, to make sales of subdivision
lots. Unable to sell the lots, plaintiff could not raise the funds necessary to service
the Southwest obligation and defaulted. Discussion commenced between plaintiff
and Southwest began discussing the execution of a deed in lieu of foreclosure at
which time Southwest had reappraised the property downward to $832,000.
Ultimately plaintiff brought an action for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation

contending

that

Southwest

had

made

affirmative

misrepresentations in appraising the property at a value of $1,020,000 and in
representing to plaintiff that the lot sales would be so good that plaintiff would not
have to come up with any other money to meet his mortgage obligations.
The jury found for plaintiff and following the trial court's denial of
Southwest's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appeal was
prosecuted.
In reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Southwest, the court of appeals reasoned:
Mere representations as to value are generally considered
expressions of opinion and will not support a claim for fraud.
[Citations omitted] Furthermore, to constitute actionable fraud, a
representation must relate to a past or existing fact, and cannot be
based on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events unless
such are made with the present intention not to perform. [Citations
omitted]
The alleged misrepresentation concerning the appraisal is a mere
representation as to value, the alleged misrepresentation concerning
the sales of lots is a statement as to future events. Accordingly, in
the absence of other alleged misrepresentations, [plaintiff's] action
for fraud cannot be based on affirmative misrepresentations.
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653 P.2d at 365-366.
2. REPRESENTATIONS OF PRICE IN AN ESTABLISHED
MARKET
In the district court Humphries correctly argued that misrepresentation
as to the value of property may constitute fraud where the representation relates
to the market value of property consistently sold at an established price in a
recognized market. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, Section 118
(1968). This exception to the general rule is recognized in Utah.
In Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch. 61 Utah 597, 217 P. 695 (1923), plaintiff
purchased a certain business in Beaver, Utah. Plaintiff alleged that under the
terms of the contract, the business was represented as having an inventory of
stock of merchandise and drugs which "at cost price in Beaver City, would total at
least $4,000." Plaintiff alleged that this representation was false and untrue and
that defendant knew it to be untrue because of his long familarity with business,
the stock therein and the cost thereof.

Defendant contended that any

representations as to value were mere expressions of opinion and not actionable
as fraud. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the general statement of law but
found the case to fall within an exception to the rule:
This doctrine is unchallenged. However, it has no application in the
instant case. Representation as to the price of the goods was not a
mere expression of opinion, but a statement of fact. The statement
was that the goods would inventory for $4,000.00 and that defendant
would guarantee the same. [Emphasis added]
61 Utah at 603.
On petition for rehearing the Court made the following clarification:
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Appellant on application for a rehearing erroneously assumes that the
opinion of the court holds him liable for mere expressions of opinion
as to value. Such is not the case. Appellant represented that the
goods would inventory a certain price and that he would guarantee
the same.
61 Utah at 605.
See also Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 87 3 (Utal i 197 8).
Statements regarding the value of personal property sold in recognized
wholesale and retail niaiktits at puces establist led oi suggested by i i tar lufactui ei s
or wholesalers are obviously statements of fact rather than mere expressions of

It is the recognition of the fact that "no piece of land has its counterpart anywhere
else" llial defTioinblrale;?. ilinh" inadequacy i it teyal inmedies and allows a "ouil in
equity for specific performance.

See generally . ,

, dri. J U L 2d, Specific

Performance, Section 1 il 2 (1973),
111 opposition to Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, Humphries nnnlnnrfnd that Wright haul fopiosented that Lhe surrour idling
property "consistently sold for $30,000 an acre" and that therefore the case was
brought

si|uiiieh

n j ,11111" 1 iilllli lhe exception in lhe general 1 ule relating tc

statements regarding the value of property consistently sold in a recognized
market. (H

•, Il I , pp.202-203)

The evidence in fact demonstrated the opposite:
properties had sold al niaikedly div
individual qualities.

'

•* ^

See Addendum

iepondmjj

the surrounding

pi n is location mil

commenting upon transactions
sell obsei ved:

Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] What amount of dollars did he tell you
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had been spent?
A. Different values for different properties. Some, I believe, were
going as high as $100,000 per acre, is what he explained to me.
* *

*

(T. 714)
3. REPRESENTATIONS INTENDED AS STATEMENTS OF FACT
VS. OPINION
In response to Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
Humphries cited 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 112 (1968) quoting the
following portion of that section:
Whether a misrepresentation as to value is merely an expression of
opinion, or an affirmation of fact or intentional misrepresentation to
be relied upon, it is generally regarded as a question of fact to be
determined by the trier of facts.
The cases cited in support of the above-quoted proposition are clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar. In each of these cases the party making the
representations regarding value either had knowledge that their representation
was false or made the representation in connection with other misrepresentations
regarding facts which would materially affect the value of the property.
Wright submitted the following proposed instruction:
The owner of property who proposes the sale or exchange thereof
may express his opinion regarding the value of the property, and if
his opinion is stated in good faith, a discrepancy between that opinion
and the appraised value of the property is not actionable as fraud.
(R. vol.IV, p.45)
Opposing counsel contended that "good faith" was not a defense to a
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation citing Smith v. Warr. 564 P.2d 77I (Utah
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some purposes and inadmissible for others and ultimately refused to give any
iribtiULtiu) ni i i JM nl faith h'diiny that riny attempt t( i instiui 1 m:\iM cciuubt-j rathei
than enlighten the jury. (R. vol.IV, p.45; T. 448-466, 1057-1060)
G.
CONCEALMENT AS FRAUD
The limited moratorium declared by the Weber County commission has
received much attention. The only testimony regarding the nature and extent of
Wright's knowledge regarding any proposed moratorium was provided through
testimony during which he explained the inquiries he had made of Richard
Schwartz, Graham Shirra and a deputy county attorney.

The evidence is

unrebutted that Wright was advised that ground water conditions were not serious
enough to justify further governmental intervention.
When the limited moratorium was eventually declared it apparently had
little impact upon the potential development of the subject property. Humphries'
own appraiser conceded that both Schwartz and Anderson were of the opinion
that the subject property would meet all of the requirements of the limited
moratorium and could be developed immediately.
Humphries acknowledged that Wright had advised him that there was no
sewer on the property and that Wright expected the sewer to be installed within 18
months. The sewer was in fact completed approximately 21 months after the date
of the exchange.
Humphries contends that Elder v. Clawson. 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d
37

802 (1963), is instructive. In Elder, plaintiffs sought and were granted rescission
of a land contract on the basis that defendants1 real estate agent had failed to
disclose the fact that the land was under quarantine for a noxious weed known as
Russian knapweed. Under the quarantine, feed produced on the property could
not be sold or used elsewhere. In that case the district court specifically found
that (1) the quarantine had been in place for some seven years prior to the date
of the sale; (2) the defendants and their agent had actual knowledge of the
quarantine; (3) before the sale defendants1 agent not only failed to disclose the fact
of the quarantine but also made statements which inferred that the weeds could
be eradicated;8 and (4) the existence of the weed and the quarantine materially
affected the economic use of the farm.
The distinctions between Elder and the instant case are more than
technical and superficial. First, in the instant case, the limited moratorium had not
been declared at the time the parties negotiated and executed the subject
contract. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Wright knew the moratorium was
pending. Even after the limited moratorium was declared, the testimony clearly
established that officials of Weber County and other knowledgeable individuals
held the opinion that the subject property would meet all the conditions of the

In his concurring opinion, Justice Crockett elaborated on the extent of the conversation
between defendants' agent and plaintiffs regarding the presence of the weed:
[Defendants' agent] pointed out the weeds to Mr. Elder and asked him if he knew
what they were to which the latter replied: "Yes, that is ragweed * * *?"
[Defendants' agent] replied, 'That is all it is. It is just starting. Get yourself a spray
can and spray it and you will be done with it."
14 Utah 2d at 384.

38

moratorium and woiilc! qi mviilif\ i lor immediate development.
in resisting Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
Hui i iphi ies ai gued:
The fact that [the limited moratorium] was enacted less than two
weeks after this transaction occurred could, in the minds of the jury,
could [sic] give rise to an inference that Plaintiff knew more than he
disclosed at the time of trial, particularly when viewed with the
circumstances surrounding his abrupt desire to get the closing
document signed. (R vol.IV, p.208)
The position taken by Humphries is troubling because it suggests that
the jury should be allowed to speculate concerning what, if any, additional
information Wright had concerning the limited moratorium when in fact there is no
evidence to indicate that there was anything else to be known. Indeed, to suggest
that the jury should be allowed to speculate on the extent of Wright's knowledge
and from that conjecture draw a conclusion of fraudulent concealment is to
suggest an entirely new standard relating to the proof of fraud claims.9
D.
KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY
The i ecoi cl is absolutely devoid of ai t) evider ice ii idicating Wr igf it
possessed knowledge of the falsity of any representation made. On the contrary,
tin* CVIKiiiiLe is untrbtitlful that
1. At the time of the transaction Weber County valued the subject three

rrom an ethical standpoint, the position taken by counsel is most disturbing in light of the fact
that counsel participated in the depositions of Richard Schwartz and Graham Shirra and is fully
aware of the fact that their depositions contain nothing which significantly contradicted Wright's
testimony.

of $104,688. (T. 968)
2. Wright was aware of a letter of opinion (Defendant's Exhibit No. 32)
written by Brent Dopp, a Weber County real estate broker, to Ed Sappington at
Sun Capital Bank stating that in his opinion the 5.39 acres located on the south
end of the same 22-acre tract had a value of $32,500 per acre.
3. There is nothing in the record indicating that Wright had recently had
the subject three acres appraised or received any letter of opinion indicating that
the property was worth less than $30,000 an acre.
E.
RECKLESSNESS AS FRAUD
Recklessness was the theme most forcefully argued by Humphries'
counsel in closing. The evidence will not support a finding of recklessness.
The values placed upon the subject property for property tax purposes,
the values placed upon adjacent property for commercial loan purposes, and
Wright's own personal knowledge of comparable sales in the area all indicated a
value in the neighborhood of $30,000 per acre.
F.
THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" STANDARD ON REVIEW
In examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding
of fraud, the appellate court should examine the evidence with reference to the
standard of proof required to sustain such a finding. See generally Northcrest,
Inc.. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co.. 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952); Lynch v.
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MacDonald l,n Utah Prl A?7 36/ P M 4P4 t\m?)

Iu

In Northcrest supra, the

Utah Supreme Court defined the term "clear and convincing evidence11 and
approved flip application nil thaf standan

r

-

appeal:
For evidence to be clear and convincing it must be such that there
is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion. [Citation omitted] The evidence so satisfied the mind of
the trial court. His finding should not be disturbed unless we must
say that no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and
convincing. [Emphasis added]
122 Utah a
Lynch, supra, was a fraud case where the finding of fraud was sustained
or i appeal with tt ie following observation:
A careful reading of the entire record establishes by clear, satisfactory
and convincing proof that the respondents were the victims of a fraud
perpetrated by their coadventurer, Doc MacDonald, assisted by
Morgan, who knowing all the facts, actively aided and abetted Doc
MacDonald in the consummation of this fraud. Morgan, therefore,
was as much guilty as was Doc MacDonald. [Citation omitted]
Where the findings and judgment are supported by the degree of
proof mentioned they cannot be disturbed on appeal. [Citation
omitted] [Emphasis added]
12 Utah 2d at 43!:!
The evidence of fraud presented in the instant case is anything but clear
and .

, allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations to

fraudulent concealment to scienter and recklessness, the evidence falls far short
ill C'Slablrsliiinij Injnil liny :,ui hi a deyiue as to ininnuj all "senoiib nnH btibstdntidl

See also Russell v. Larkin. Case No. 870264-CA, an unpublished opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals, filed October 25,1988, wherein this Court acknowledged the application of the clear and
convincing evidence standard in affirming a directed verdict dismissing a complaint alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation.

41

doubt."
POINT II
THE JURY'S DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THE REAL
PROPERTY IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
UNFOUNDED IN LAW.
The jury awarded Humphries the sum of $38,582 on his claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation. This figure was arrived at by reference to the sale
price Humphries actually obtained when he sold the property in March 1988. (T.
1147) There was no evidence indicating that the property had been sold at fair
market value. "One sale does not make the market."
To the figure of $35,300 ($90,000 minus $54,700), the jury added the
sum of $3,282, a figure representing six percent of the sale price, $54,700,
concluding that the obligation to pay the real estate sales commission should be
imposed upon Wright. (T. 1147)

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT REQUIRING
PLAINTIFF TO INDEMNIFY DEFENDANT HUMPHRIES ON HIS
EXECUTION OF THE $30,000 PROMISSORY NOTE IN FAVOR OF
ZIONS BANK
The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the overdrafts
in the Westside Nursery account in mid-December 1985 were directly attributable
to the payment of obligations which should have been paid by Humphries. Had
no further funds been withdrawn from Zions Bank after the initial withdrawal of the
$15,000 on December 13, 1985, it is obvious that Wright would have had no
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nothing more than reimburse the account the funds which Humphries was required
to repay.
The difficulty in Humphries' position arises out of the fact of the issuance
ci a tempouiy restraininn order on Decwmlvr l1'!, I9H6, ennniiny hnn tiom
incurring further obligations for which Wright or the nursery would be responsible.
Notwithstanding the tact that this cuilei was served upon Humphnies on i i about
December 26, 1985, he withdrew an additional $15,000 from Zions Bank.
While it is undisputed that tt iese funds wei e deposited in ito the Westside
Nursery account, Humphries should be denied indemnification therefor for three
reasons: (Vj the funds -Attn nrt netossary to (i^f\

obligations which Wright had

already incurred, (2) the funds were withdrawn from the bank and deposited in the

Humphries' employer and the court order, and (3) Humphries failed to comply with
the legitimate requests ot the court-appointed receivei i/vho wau dttempting to
account for the expenditure of all loan proceeds which accounting could only be
accomplishes] n/ ,i ronipanson ot me Oefooei - i , i ton iinvonlni,/ HIKI inn Man i
25, 1986, inventory.
It must be borne in mind that from nmi-UHCumliei through late Mftnjh,
Humphries was in possession of the nursery, denying Wright's ownership and any
c ™rocn n nHirii

i ~i, * t \Q vVricijiht as his en iployei

A - a general principle of law, an agent is under a duty to keep and
r*

'-"

A

oil an account < il all ninuny n

'thai proper t ) " wi lief 1 I le has

received or paid out on behalf of his principal. If the principal proves or the agent
admits that the agent has come into possession of money or other property for the
principal, the agent has the burden of proving that he had paid it to the principal
or disposed of it in accordance with his authority. See generally Restatement
Second, Agency. Section 382, Comment e.
An agent who is disloyal or insubordinate is not entitled to indemnity if
he knowingly acts without authority and officiously. Furthermore, even if he acts
in good faith believing that his actions are authorized, he is entitled to indemnity
only to the extent that the principal has in fact benefited as a result of the agent's
acts. See generally Restatement Second, Agency. Section 469, Comment d, and
Section 439, Comment i. Comment i reads in relevant part as follows:
An agent who, without authority and officiously pays a debt of the
principal or assumes an obligation on the principal's account is not
entitled to indemnity although the payment results in a benefit to the
principal. [Citation omitted] If, however, he acts in good faith
mistakenly believing that he is authorized or that his principal's
interest require his action, he may be entitled to indemnity to the
extent that the principal has benefited, in accordance with the
principles of restitution. [Citations omitted]
The evidence clearly established that Humphries knew that his authority
to incur further debt on behalf of Wright or Westside Nursery had been terminated
by order of the district court.
Even if the jury believed that Humphries was acting in good faith,
mistakenly believing that he was authorized or that Wright's interests required his
action, his right to indemnity is commensurate with his ability to establish, through
an appropriate accounting, the extent of the benefit conferred upon his principal.
Wright requested and proposed numerous instructions advising the jury
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c

V nnicinagtji a n d tin* extent

of Humphries' burden

^

instructions were- rei . <-

. >

- -

r

indemnification 1 1
]

These

"v,.| IV, pp 16-55, T 1057-

1060)
Without appropriate instruction tin\ \\n\ *» -"".vr. Ii'if \ »"'il!ifii.il guidance
concerning the burden Humphries must carry in order t o establish the right to
reimbursement oi II idcrnnitication Oi K:H Huinpl iries established thai the funds had
been initially deposited into the nursery account the district court in effect shifted
tho I iijinltn nit pirnii In ll/nphil

II in ipsnlt uu.is Ihdt I Ii i n i p l i i i K .

nusti i i it his

employer, his violation of his employer's instructions and the court's order w e r e
v »ritl ioi; it coi iseqt ler ice
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
Attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); Turtle
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). if an
award of attorney's fees is based oi i contract i lal stipulate
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Trayner v. Cushing,

1

One of the refused instructions read as follows:
You are instructed that before Defendant Humphries is entitled to seek
Indemnification for any funds borrowed in connection with his execution of a certain
promissory note in favor of Zions First National Bank dated December 5,1985, he
must show that in truth and in fact any funds withdrawn on said promissory note
were used for the purpose of discharging Plaintiff's obligations, that the draw
against the promissory note was authorized by Plaintiff, and that the funds were
not drawn in violation of the order of this court. (R. vol.IV, p.48)

688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); see also L&M Corp. v. Loader. 688 P.2d 448 (Utah
1984) (contractual provision allowing attorney's fees was not applicable where the
contract was not subject of litigation).
The only relevant contractual provision relating to liability for attorney's
fees is contained in the Agreement for Purchase of Assets (Plaintiff's Exhibit No.
1). Paragraph 10(c) states:
In the event of any legal action brought by either party for the
purpose of enforcing performance of any covenant or representation
hereunder or for damages for breach thereof, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover from the breaching party attorneys' fees
and costs as shall be determined by the Court.
Wright succeeded in establishing the enforceability of the subject
contracts.

He obtained a declaratory judgment establishing that he had not

contracted to assume Humphries' obligation to discharge the January 1985
promissory note in favor of Zions Bank. He also established his entitlement to
$13,577 which Humphries had misappropriated in the course of his management
of the nursery.
Humphries failed in his attempt to avoid the enforceability of the
contracts but succeeded in obtaining a money judgment on his claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation. Whether or not the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is
sustained on appeal, this claim does not provide a basis for an award of attorney's
fees since it falls outside the contractual provision relating to liability for attorney's
fees.
It is respectfully submitted that Wright has or should prevail on all issues
related to the enforcement of the underlying contracts and therefore Humphries is
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and/or defense of this action.

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING I Hfi HXONE- HA1 ION ()f
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BOND.
The relevant provisions of Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, read
as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, no restraining order or
preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems
proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may
be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. [Emphasis added]
The injunction bond posted by Wright only provides security fo«"

injunction bond covers liability only for damages resulting from the operation of the
inji motion.
A party applying for relief under Rule 65A is not required to give security
fi it the payment uf an\,, juili|rrif>nl wlw h may be takei i agaii ist I lit i i or i ar ly tl leory
His obligation to provide security is limited to costs and damages incurred as a

Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions. Section 315. Accordingly, liability on the bond does not
arise,

-

-

-

-x

.

i

m

establishing that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. See generally 42
Ai i i i Jt IF.2d, Injunctions, Section 382

Such a clHcfniination has never ueen inuup
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in this case and in fact the district court, on November 11, 1986, dismissed
Humphries' Counterclaim for rescission thus extinguishing any claim for damages
arising out of Wright's court-ordered possession of the nursery business.
None of the damages awarded Humphries in this action arise out of the
wrongful issuance of any court order. Wright has posted a cash supersedeas
bond in connection with the prosecution of this appeal. This bond provides
adequate security for the payment of any sum to which Humphries may be
entitled.
There is no jusification for requiring the injunction bond to remain in
force and effect through the pendency of this appeal. Wright is obligated to
continue to pay a annual premium in the amount of $1,000 while the bond remains
in force. Furthermore, in the event Humphries takes any action in an attempt to
enforce the forfeiture of the bond, Wright will incurr liability to his bondsman for the
payment of attorney's fees and other costs associated with the defense of any
forfeiture proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The value of real property is subjective. It is a matter of opinion. The
fair market value of property is the price which would induce a willing seller to sell
and a willing buyer to buy.
In this case the jury was charged with the duty of determining the value
of the subject real estate by clear and convincing evidence. Such a finding would
not only establish the extent of the damages but, under Humphries' theory of the
case, establish whether or not fraud had in fact been committed.
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The jjii II y accomplish-

^

„-

!

"~

ne

licensed appraisers and fixing the value based upon the price obtained by an
ovvnet whi i Iliad demonstrated little interest in IIif- piopenly ami /In A/a in fact
engaged in litigation asserting its virtual worthlessness.
An « vvnif i i ill K .ill piopMly inusl ho allowed In btale his good faith i ipmioii
regarding its value without fear of liability in the event someone disagrees with his
assessment or .is in this case, the property later sdis at a price below his stated
opinion.
Thn llir,iiJ(l " ruin I cannull he sustained ". afhuul exalting consuiiiensm
above enterprise, cynicism above initiative.
V /I lile it i nay be easiei foi tl le Coi JI 11 D subi 1 lit to tl le vei diet of a ji iry thai i
it is to assign reasons why it is unable to do so, it is respectfully submitted that the

review of the entire record.
It lis respectfi jlly subr 1 lifted that the judgi i lei it should be reversed and
remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Wright on the claims of
fraudulent misrepresentation and! inilnnnilicatii m, no cause ot action
The judgment should also be reversed to the extent that it awards
Humphries attorney's tecs and the on lei denying Wughl s mi »fn HI II J exone rate thn
injunction bond should also be reversed.
Finally Wilight should rpcnvni Inn, costs and attorney's tees, incuri ed ii i

- i

the prosecution of this appeal and in the defense of Humphries' cross appeal.
DATED this 3^

day of January, 1989.

13/
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant, George Ronald Wright
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this
day of January, 1989, I did
personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Motion to
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendant at 250 South Main, P. O. Box 726,
Cedar City, Utah 84720.

Gary W. Pendleton
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THIS AGREEMENT is entered into as o:
u

»

te^ieiEi^r, 198 5, by ana between WESTSIEE NURSERU,

c^s^a Par tnership ("Seller"' ,

DkRREL

and its principal general partner

HUMPHRIES, an individual of \~5Hi,' ijta^/ ("Humphries"), and GEORGE
RONALD WRIGHT, an individual

("Buyer'),

RECITALS OF FACT
A.

Seller

is

a

Utah

Limited

Partnership

business of .operating a nursery in St. George, Utah.
Partnership

has

also

improved

and maintained

in

the

the Limited

certain

leasehold

property used in connection with its business at 1425 West Sunset
Boulevard, St. George, Utah.
B.

Seller

and Humphries desire that Seller

sell, and

Buyer purchase, substantially all of the assets of Seller, except
the leasehold interest of Seller, as hereinafter detailed.
C.
nursery

Humphries desires

business

at

the

to remain as the manager

presently

existing

location

of

the

under

management contract with Buyer, to which the parties have agreed
pursuant t :) a separate Employment Agreement related hereto.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the
•mutual

covenants

contained

herein,

it

is

hereby

agreed and covenanted between the parties as follows:

represented,

1.
to

this

herein)

S u b j e c t of S a l e .

Agreement
shall

Seller,

The p r o p e r t y

(collectively

consist

of

(a)

All

referred

substantially

i n c l u d i n g , without

to be s o l d
to

all

as
of

pursuant
"Assets'1

the
the

Assets

of

limitation:

of

the

rights

presently

belonging' to S e l l e r ,

business

licenses

and

to

the

rights

other

nursery
of

business

assignment

intangibles

of

relating

thereto;
(b)

The r i g h t to use t h e t r a d e name of

N u r s e r y " or any v a r i a t i o n t h e r e o f ,
of

for

Sice

the e x c l u s i v e

use

Buyer;
(c)

All personal property belonging

pertaining

to

the

nursery

business

i n v e n t o r y on the p r e m i s e s of S e l l e r
of,

"West

to S e l l e r

and

including

all

as of t h e d a t e

here-

t o g e t h e r with a l l t o o l s , e q u i p m e n t , m a c h i n e r y ,

motor

vehicles

and

all

appurtenances

thereto

as

more

d e t a i l e d and scheduled on E x h i b i t A a t t a c h e d
(d)

Accounts r e c e i v a b l e

held

on t h e

fully

hereto;
books

and/or

b e l o n g i n g to S e l l e r .
In
Seller

addition,

it

has been a g r e e d

among the p a r t i e s

s h a l l c o n t i n u e to l e a s e the p r e m i s e s but s h a l l a l l o w Buyer

to operate

the b u s i n e s s

to whatever

extent

i t deems

appropriate

so long as t h e terms of the l e a s e a r e n o t v i o l a t e d by such
2.
pursuant
for

that

Terms

of

Sale.

Seller

will

sell

to t h i s Agreement- and Buyer h e r e b y p u r c h a s e s

the
the

use,
Assets
Assets

t h e amounts and payable for the f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n : •

-2-

(a)
estate

Buyer
located

described
The

shall deliver

on

in

Weber

the deeds

original deeds

to Seller, certain

County,

attached

transferring

Utah,

hereto
title

real

specifically
as Exhibit

to the

B.

property

shall be executed and delivered as a part of -this Agreement.

Buyer

warrants

that

title

thereto

is free

and

clear, subj€cflt to taxes which are unpaid and due for the
year 19 8^^

In addition, Buyer shall provide at its own

expense a policy of title insurance covering

the value

of the land conveyed,
(b)

Buyer shall contract with Humphries to provide

management services on a contract basis as hereinafter
set forth in the Contract for Management Services which
is incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C*
(c)
incurred

Seller shall assume all debts and obligations
by

Agreement.

the

business

Seller

prior

represents

to

the

that

date

such

of

this

debts

and

obligations are fully described on the attached Exhibit
D •

(d)

All

accounts

receivable

incurred

by

Seller

and/or Humphries in connection with the operation of the
business as described herein.

A list of such accounts

is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
(e)

Buyer

shall

not

assume

any

liabilities

obligations of Seller and Humphries, and Seller and

-3-

or

Humphries hereby warrant and represent to Buyer neither
of

them shall have

any

remaining

obligations

due to

creditors uoon closing of this transaction, except one

o
Promissory Note

to Zionus

m^rst

National

Bank

in

the

^r

a-.ount cf $ /s> , CC<? -^ ^
vhlcfl^'shall be palcvtvby c ct 3 c. /<ttf c-/*^.
and raiscel-aneoCis t r a c e account of
not more than $ * ^ s * # ,/!.
to be assumed
Buyer•
3.

-Trade Nrmes.

By reason of the assignment to B u : e :
>'

hereunder

the r i g h t

derivative
names

extent

thereto

in by Buyer.
that

business.

in

Humphries,

with

such

connection

with

any

other

business

Humphries makes the same covenant to the
in the

S e l l e r furtner

accordance

a g r e e s not to use said names o r v a n y

thereof, S e l l e r

similar

engaged

to use the name "West Side Nursery" or any

future,

may encage

in any other

agrees t h a t i t w i l l change i t s name in

laws

in

order

to

avoid

any

potential

c o n f l i c t with the business purchased by Buyer hereunder.
4.
diminishing
sales
hereof.

Sales

Taxes.

Seller

the accounts r e c e i v a b l e ,

and use taxes due for

agrees

that,

without

i t w i l l pay a l l Utah

a l l periods ending as of

tne

Buyer w i l l be l i a b l e for a l l such taxes from and

state
date
after

such d a t e .
5.

Bulk Sales Compliance.

Seller

agrees

that

as

to

any c r e d i t o r s of S e l l e r who would not be paid in due course by
Buyer pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2(a) hereof, S e l l e r has

obtained waivers of the application of the Bulk Sales Act o£ the
laws-of the State cf Utah or can establish an exemption from such
law, and Seller will obtain an opinion of its counsel supporting
the representations of this paragarph.
6.
.Management

Management.
Services,

Pursuant

Exhibit

C, Buyer

Humphries', and Humphries has agreed
manager of the nursery
St.

to

have

contract covering
time

to contract

to perform services, as the

in the Contract for Management

agreed .u^p

Furthermore, both Seller

iVficncompeti t ion covenant

of i •' ^•^•rJ^===^^==^/ .after

period

for

business at 1425 West Sunset Boulevard,

George, Utah, as set forth

Humphries

Contract

has agreed

Services attached hereto as Exhibit C.
and

the

for a

of Humphries 1

the termination

the geographical service area of Buyer at the

of termination.

In addition

to contractual

arrangements

with Humphries, it is agreed that Buyer shall be responsible for
employing

and

paying

employees

as

may be

continued operation of the nursery business.
shall

be

responsible

for

day-to-day

necessary

for the

However, Humphries

supervision

of

Buyer's

employees.
7=5=^—R-ep-ur chase-;—
disobility
hereof,

of

Seller

Buyer
shall

t-hp

a period

p'-^nh
of

one

of

the

v^a-r^lfrxjm

ce-a t-hthe

date

have t h e r i g h t ^ r O r e p u r c h a s e any and a l l

the

rights

the

properJ^^rlTginally
r

conveyed

within

Tn

herejwrfer

for

transferee

the

then

by Buyer

fair

market

to Seller

f buuh d e a t h err Si^s-^i^-i-t-ys—pi :ig t-;]_e v a l u e of any

value
as of

of
of
the

issSoansGC—G-SAgreement,

with

interest

(15%)

per

shall

be

established

Buyer

to

Seller.

In

the

annum

event

m e — c a J ru

U» O O <Aiii V

during

accrued
the

by

are

rate of

period.

of

shall pay

parties

the

one-year

appraisal

Seller

the

at

Fai.^market

the^cost
mutual

of

such

agreement

with

additional

appraisers

perform

appraisal,

an

the

theh^seiect

results of which

an

this

seC/ticn,

disability

shall
?_ r.9d ;-

rLi-S^Lu ! 1 i h y P. ^ r- P - h - f ; c j by

Th-e—5_.n-ggn ' ~ g
right

of^any

continue
perform
the

member

the
all

of

Contract

simultaneously
immediate
to

in

one

"*• "* <* or

immediate

the

the Buyer's

For

n

u

Management

?ocourposes

8.

to
of

psj^cent

Seprlces,

to t a ' ^ c v e r

Buv^c^cad

a

(10)

days

of

Seller's

Maintenance of Lease.

of

and

this Agreement

Exhibit

electTlon^by

and

assume

C,

entered

member

family^to continue the business must^be^made
Ten

to

Or .

obligations^dnder

S^v^TL'^Lu t i A b i C t ^ e — t i v e — g A p u m h j L ^ P p r n v i g i n n . q

/

appraiser

hundred

family

place^of

herewith^^rhe

Seller>^;ithin

select

ropi^nVj^ c^a—px.o v i 5 i o n — i s~-^p^i b j e c t — t o -

of Buyer's

business

mean

the

shall be presumed

be the proper considerations for the repurchase.

by

appraisal.

the appraiser h i r e ^ b y ^ S e l l e r , then each shall
shall

value

transferee

findings of

who

v-»-i -^ ^>

A.

f i f teea^oercen t

the property

not i n

u

written
this

of

and
into

Buyer's

in writing
request

to

S6C(-!f,n,.

Buyer shall, on or before the

19th day of each month, pay the amount due under Sellers rental
Agreement with James La Vae Smith, dated February 23, 1985
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D^US

ten percent

(10%).

Seller

shallmaintaln

and keep the lease of

the premises paid up and current at all times.

In the event any

Notice of Default is delivered to Seller, Seller shall deliver a
copy of the same to Buyer and cure such default witnin Ten
days of such notice.

(10)

In the event Seller fails to cure default

within Ten (10) days, Buyer may, at his discretion make the lease
payment

in

the

Seller's

stead

and

may,

at

his

discretion,

terminate the contract for Management services, Exhibit C.
9.
covenants

Representations

of

Seller.

and representations hereinabove

In

addition

stated, Seller

to

hereby

represents to Buyer as follows:
(a)

Seller

organized

is

a Utah

and existing

Utah with full power

Limited

Partnership

duly

under the laws of the State of
to enter

into this Agreement

and

execute all documents pertaining hereto;
(b)
Partner

Seller has been duly authorized by its General
to

otherwise

sell
carry

substantially
out

the

terms

all
of

of

the

Assets

and

this Agreement

and

perform'its covenants hereunder; and
(c)

Seller has provided to Buyer ample opportunity

to inspect the Assets sold hereunder together* with the
books of account and other documents and records pertaining

thereto, and has no knowledge of any material

obligations
would

or

contingent

liabilities

of

Seller

which

impact-this Agreement and which have not already

been disclosed to Buyer or would be easily discoverable

-7-

by an examination of the books and r e c W d s of Seller.

10 .

General.
(a)

It

is expressly understood

that Buyer

assumes

no indebtedness or obligation of any nature presently or
at any time in the future owed to any creditor by Seller
or

Humphries;

Agreement,

except

and

Agreement

or

construed

Buyer
any

to

as

expressly

disclaims

document

create

set

forth

any

intent

related

hereto

benefits

for

any

in

this

that

this

shall

be

other

such

by

laws

creditor.
(b)

This Agreement

shall

be

governed

the

of the State of Utah in its interpretation.
(c)

In

the

event

of

any

legal

action

brought

by

either party for "the purpose of enforcing performance of
any

covenant or

for

breach

entitled

representation

thereof,

to recover

the

from

hereunder

prevailing

or for

party

the breaching

damages

shall

be

attorneys 1

party

fees and, costs as shall be determined by the C o u r t .
(d) • In
under

the

event

any

written

notice

is

this Agreement, the parties shall agree

required
to effect

either personal delivery or delivery by U.S. m a i l ,
class

postage

opposite
which

the

either

prepaid,

addressed

signatures
party

may

hereunder

to
or

subsequently

to the other.

-8-

any

the

addresses

other

confirm

first

in

address
writing

IN WITNESS WHEREOF#

the parties h c A hereunto executed

this Agreement effective as of the day and year

first above

written.

WESTS IDE NURSERY,
a Utah Limited Partnershlo

Darrel Humphries, General Partner

SELLER:

0
Darrel Humphries

\^

BUYER:

I

/^eorg^ Ronald Wright

Al-20
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EXHIBIT "A"
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF SELLEF.

/?LL

7>£AU7
SQt- f~f>c kJcjt-

HfirencU,Stcpp//e£,
J fee Asa rsetn.

*"dprrj*UA/'

ffirpperry

AJCV

£-xtcr/v?

EXHIBIT "E"
DEEDS TO OGDEN PROPERTY

EXHIBIT "Dn
SCHEDULE OF DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER
'ui /vrtve.

(3) J9S« Trace r0Ab
HJ

/4tZ

vUr-CurXf

f

{Pou^^e

„; j ^^

^ U « / hr«*
_

_

.«.

?, ceo
_
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ADDENDUM B

CONTRACT FOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES

AGREEMENT made between DARR2L HUMPHRIES, of Veyo, Utah,
County of Washington, State of Utah, ("Contractor") and GEORGE
RONALD WRIGHT, whose principal place of business is located
City

of

St.

George,

County

of- Washington,

State

of

at

Utah,

("Owner") .

RECITALS
1.

Owner

is engaged

in the business of operating

a

plant nursery at wholesale and retail and related products, and
maintains

or will maintain

an ongoing business

in St. George,

County of Washington, State of utah.
2.

Contractor

has been engaged

and

ha.s had

a great

deal of experience in the above-designated business.
3.
is willing

Contractor is willing to perform services and Owner
to engage Contractor

for management services on the

terms, covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth.
4.

Owner has pruchased the nursery from, among others,

Contractor himself as of the date hereof.
For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of
the mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, Owner
and Contractor agree as follows:

app > 5 1988

SECTION ONE
TERMS OF PERFORMANCE
Owner hereby engages Contractor as a manager of the West
Side

Nursery

and Contractor

hereby accepts and agrees

to such

engagement, subject to the general supervision and pursuant to
the orders, advice, and direction of Owner.

Contractor

perform

such

other duties as are customarily performed

holding

such

position

in other, same, or similar

enterprises as that engaged in by Owner,
Contractor

is an independent proprietor

shall
by one

business or

It is understood

that

and not an employee of

Owner,
SECTION TWO
BEST EFFORTS OF CONTRACTOR
Contractor agrees that he will at all times faithfully,
industriously,

and to the best of his ability, experience and

talents, perform all of the duties that may be required

of and

from him pursuant to the express and implicit terms hereof, to
the reasonable satisfaction of Owner.
SECTION THREE
TERM OF CONTRACT
The term of this Agreement shall be a period of one (1)
year,

commencing

(¥-*

S^^etntrtrr
as

hereinafter

^S^TA^^A^S^^

,

,1A/

V#>-.^

, 198 (o ^ s u b j e c t ,
provided.

1985,

At the e x p i r a t i o n

agreement between the

parties.

-2-

.

terminating

however, t o p r i o r

may be renewed for p e r i o d s of one year s u b j e c t
further

and

date

this

. .

termination
Agreement

to n e g o t i a t i o n

and

SECTION FOUR
COMPENSATION
Owner shall pay Contractor, and Contractor shall accept
%Tv,hc^s hereunder,
^*3or

compensation at^^ejrate of
(? ts50. C&£^^JJ

PCtT^^^r

^Thousand Dollars

y^'pfer year, payable twice monthly as of the 1st

j
and

15th

day

of

each month

while

this Agreement

shall be in

force.
Owner
expenses

shall

incurred

reimburse

by

Contractor

Contractor

while

for

traveling

all

necessary

pursuanc

to

Owner ! s directions.
SECTION FIVE
TERMINATION DUE TO DISCONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS
Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding,

in

the

event

that Owner

shall discontinue

operating

its

business at St. George, State of Utah, then this Agreement shall
terminate as of the last day of the month on which Owner ceases
operations at such location with the same force and effect as if
such last day of the month were originally set as the termination
date hereof.
SECTION SIX
OTHER TIME OBLIGATIONS
Contractor
attention,

shall devote substantially all of his time,

knowledge,

and

skills

solely

to

the

business

and

interest of Owner, and Owner shall be entitled to all of the
benefits, profits or other issues arising from or incident to all

-3-

work, services, and advice of Contractor, and Contractor
not,

during

the

term

hereof,

serve

as

officer,

shall

director,

employee, or in any other capacity in any other business similar
to Owner's business or any allied trade; provided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or limit the
right

of

Contractor

to manage personal

and

family

investments

thac do not compete with Owner's business,
SECTION SEVEN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS
Contractor shall make available to employer all information of which Contractor shall have any knowledge and shall make
all suggestions and recommendations that will be of mutual benefit to Owner and himself,
SECTION EIGHT
TRADE SECRETS
Contractor

shall

not

at

any

time

or

in

any

manner,

either directly or indirectly, divulge, disclose or communicate
to any person, firm or corporation in any manner whatsoever any
information concerning any matters affecting or relating

to the

business of Owner, including without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, any of its customers, the prices it obtains or has
obtained from the sale of, or at which it sells or has sold, its
products, source of supply, or any other

information concerning

the business of Owner, its manner of operation, its plans, processes, or other data without regard to whether all of the foregoing

matters will be deemed confidential, material, or
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impor-

tant, the parties hereto stipulating

that as between

them, the

same are important, material, and confidential and gravely affedt
the effective and successful conduct of the business of Owner,
and Owner's good will, and that any breach of the terms of this
paragraph shall be a material breach of this Agreement.
SECTION NINE
AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT
This contract contains the complete agreement concerning
the arrangement between the parties and shall, as of the effective

date

parties.

hereof,

supersede

all other

agreements

between

the

However, this contract shall be consistent with a Pur-

chase of Assets Agreement of even date herewith.

The parties

stipulate that neither of them has made any representation with
respect to the subject matter cf this Agreement or any representations

including

the execution

and delivery hereof

except such

representations as are specifically set forth herein and each of
the parties hereto acknowledges that he or it has relied on its
own judgment in entering into this Agreement.

The parties hereto

further acknowledge that any payments oS representations that may
have heretofore been made by either of them to* the other are of
no effect and that neither of them has relied thereon in connection with his or its dealings with the other.
SECTION TEN
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
No waiver or modification of this Agreement or of any
covenant,

condition,

or

limitation

-5-

herein

contained

shall

be

valid

unless

in writing

and duly executed

by the party

to be

charged therewith and no evidence of any proceeding, arbitration,
cr

litigation

affecting

between

the

parties

hereto

arising

out

of

this Agreement, or the rights or obligations

or

of the

parties hereunder, unless such waiver or modification is in writing, duly executed

as aforesaid, and the parties further

agree

that the provisions of this section may not be waived except as
herein set forth.
SECTION ELEVEN
TERMINATION
In the event of any violation by Contractor of any of
the

terms

of

this

contract, Owner

thereon may

terminate

this

Management Agreement without notice and with pay only to the date
of

such -termination.

evasion

of

hereto

will

other

any of
result

party

and

It is further agreed that any breach or

the

terms of this contract by either

in immediate

will

authorize

and irreparable
recourse

to

party

injury

to the

injunction

and/or

specific performance as well as to all other legal or equitable
remedies to which such injured party may be entitled hereunder.
SECTION TWELVE
NONCOMPETITION COVENANT
Upon
expiration

termination

hereof

by

of

this

contract

its Utodrms//Contractor

TWO ( 1* y£TAr$
period of -^rs^j^^^Xr^.

for

cause

agrees

or

that

upon
for a

p^Vf^K

sJ aft-^r the date of such termination he

shall not compete with the nursery, gardening sales and/or plant
sales,

related

business

of

Owner
-6-

by serving

in

any

competing

proprietorship, partnership, corporation or otherwise, in the
States of Utah, Nevada, Oregon or Arizona.

Contractor acknow-

ledges that the restrictions above stated are reasonable.

It is

agreed between the parties that the consideration for the noncompetition covenant is the Agreement for Partial Purchase of
Assets executed on the same date hereof, pursuant to which Owner
purchased the personal property assets of West Side Nursery, the
former business owned by Contractor in his capacity as General
Partner.
SECTION THIRTEEN
SEVERABILITY
All agreements and covenants contained herein are severable, and in the event any of them shall be held to be invalid by
any competent court, this contract shall be interpreted

as if

such invalid agreements or covenants were not contained herein.
SECTION FOURTEEN
CHOICE OF LAW
It is the intention of the parties hereto that this
Agreement and the performance hereunder and all suits and special
proceedings hereunder be construed in accordance with and under
and pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto executed
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t h i s c o n t r a c t e f f e c t i v e as of_^eu&gS5ir

, 1985.

OWNER:

^ / )/f!&/JRonald

Wright

CONTRACTOR:

DarrelHaraphriesA

Al-21
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ADDENDUM C-1

ADDENDUM C-2

ADDENDUM D

float<&

JJU/»/>M'*L

KX-"^

Timothy B. Anderson of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
One South Main, Suite 300
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627

t*y

IP***'*}"*^-

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

vs.
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a U t a h
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

Civil No. PSZ-CS3 6>

Defendants.

oooOooo
The above entitled Court, having

reviewed

the plain-

tiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order
to

Show

Cuase, and

the Verified

Complaint

of

Geroge

Ronald

Wright, now finds as follows:
1.

It appears from the Verified Complaint that plain-

tiff purchased from the defendants the business known as Westside
Nursery on or about October 4, 1985, and that plaintiff has since
that date purchased additional substantial plant materials and
other personal property and placed these on the Westside Nursery
business premises for resale to the public.

2.

It appears that the defendant Darrel Humphries has

been in possession and control of the Westside Nursery with all
of its property, books and accounts since the sale to the plaintiff, pursuant to a management contract between plaintiff and
defendant.
3.

It appears

that defendants

now

allege

that the

agreements of October 4, 1985, are rescinded and terminated.
4.

It

appears,

from

the

defendants'

letters

that

defendants' assert an owership interest in all of the property
which was purportedly sold to plaintiff on October 4, 1985.
5.

It appears from the defendants' letters, that defen-

dants intend to conduct the business at the Westside Nursery for
their own account and benefit.
6.

It appears from the defendants' letters, that defen-

dants intend to assume control and ownership of plant material
and other property purchased by plaintiff after the sale, and to
remove from the busi^Hss presmises other property purchased by
the plaintiff for resale and to deliver the same to plaintiffs
personal residence.
7.

It appears that plaintiff

alleges that defendant

Humphries has assaulted and physically abused him and interferes
with his person and conduct of his business.
8.

It appears that unless the defendants are restrained

or prevented from selling, hypothecating, removing, altering or
damaging the business, property and books, are restrained from
entering into new debts or obligations in the business name, and
- 2 -

restrained

from harassing

and

interfering with the plaintiff,

that the plaintiff's business will suffer irreparable damage.
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
WHEREFORE, the Court enters its Temporary Restraining
Order as follows:
1.
selling,

Defendants

injuring,

are hereby

destroying,

restrained

wasting,

from removing,

hypothecating

or

encumbering any of the personal or real property associated in
any

way

with

Westside

Nursery,

including

motor

vehicles,

regardless of who purchased said property or brought it to the
premises, except as such property may be sold to the public for
fair consideration in the normal course of business*
2.

Defendants are hereby restrained from compromising,

releasing, altering, or destroying any of the books or accounts
of the Westside Nursery, except to reflect new transactions, and
are restrained from incurring any debt or obligation in the name
of plaintiff or Westside Nursery.
3.

Defendants are hereby restrained from entering the

the plaintiff's personal residence.
4.

Defendants are hereby restrained from communicating

with the plaintiff, except as reasonably necessary to conduct the
business, or touching the person of the plaintiff, or otherwise
harassing the plaintiff or interfering in the plaintiff's conduct
of his business.

- 3 -

5.

This Order is issued on the giving of security by

plaintiffs in the form of a bond or undertaking
adequate and proper sureties in the sum of %f^ ( /

supported by

\k~'

for payment of costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered
by the defendants if they have incurred or suffered damages having been wrongfully enjoined or restrained,
ISSUED this

of ^ftfS

'^ /

day of December, 1985, at the hour

P.M..
BY--IQE COURT
)

//

/

/

s

*;/•&{4L,.i)({h/tY
" J. HARLXN'BURNS
DISTRICT COURT
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

2T?

The defendants are .Ordered to appear on the
of [jjJJ^Ml/

, 198jj

dav

, at the hour of //'V M /T^-m., at

the Hall of Justice, 220 North 200 East, St. George, Utah, and
show cause, if any they have, why this Temporary

Restraining

Order should not become a preliminary injunction pending resolution of the issues on the.^nejrlts.
DATED this

/ / day of December, 1985.

/ "J. HARLAM BURNS
DISTRICT JUDGE
/

WRIGHTA

'/A
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ADDENDUM E

/..

RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WEBEfi COUNTY, UTAH

V_

.
M*J-

WHEREAS, the p u b l i c h e a l t h and welfare concerns of c i t i z e n s of Weber
bounty d i c t a t e t h a t i t i s necessary to impose a l i m i t e d moratorium on
ievelopment of any property l o c a t e d w i t h i n the boundaries of the Dintah
i i g h l a n d s Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t .
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED AND ORDERED, pursuant t o the authority of
:he Weber County Commission granted under Otah Code Annotated S e c t i o n s 17-5-35,
I 7 - 5 - 4 9 , and 1 7 - 5 - 7 7 f

that a l i m i t e d moratorium on the development Qf any

) r c p e r t y l o c a t e d w i t h i n the boundaries of the Dintah Highlands Water* and Sewer
Improvement D i s t r i c t i s hereby implemented under the following terms u n t i l an
adequate, approved p u b l i c sewer system has been constructed and i s o p e r a t i o n a l :

' ,^

1. ) As of the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s moratorium, no new s u b d i v i s i o n s in

y •

;he Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t w i l l be approved.
v <0

Any proposed e x c e p t i o n to paragraph 1 must be approved by the Weber

bounty Commission and be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by a w r i t t e n statement from the
Feber^Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department that the s u b d i v i s i o n i s l o c a t e d i n an
irea where i t s development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate, d e p r e c i a t e , or i n
my manner have a n e g a t i v e impact on present s o i l , groundwater, surface water,
>r d r a i n a g e c o n d i t i o n s i n the Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement
)istrict.
3.

Prior t o t h e development of any individual l o t , including those

. o c a t e d i n e x i s t i n g s u b d i v i s i o n , the developer must f i r s t obtain w r i t t e n
ipproval from the Weber-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department to ensure t h a t :
a?

A currehETcomprehensive s o i l ^ a n d groundwater e v a l u a t i o n has been

«.
iade of t h e s i t e ;

APR 2 5 W8o

f

ToEFENDANT'S I
•*

rvuiniT

I

b.

S o i l and groundwater c o n d i t i o n s are in f u l l compliance w i t h a l l

a t e and l o c a l r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s , codes and ordinances p e r t a i n i n g t o
d i v i d u a l wastewater d i s p o s a l systems; and
c.

The proposed development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate,

t p r e c i a t e , or i n any manner have a negative impact on present

soil,

^oundwater, s u r f a c e water or drainage conditions i n the Dintah Highlands Water
nd Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t ,
d.

I t i s contemplated t h a t these l o t s w i l l be considered and approved

r r e j e c t e d on an i n d i v i d u a l , case-by-case b a s i s .
In t h e opinion of the Weber County Board of Commissioners, i t s

is

l e c e s s a r y t h a t t h i s p o l i c y go i n t o e f f e c t Immediately upon p u b l i c a t i o n i n order
;o p r e s e r v e the h e a l t h of the i n h a b i t a n t s of Weber County.
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of Weber County,
Utah a t a r e g u l a r meeting thereof held on the

/ 3?

day of

GcZcJj^t^

1985,
BOARD OFjWfifel COUNTY IStfklSSIONERS

WILLIAM BAILEY
ATTEST:
RICHARD GREENE

By >
DEftTtY CLERK

^

(J

,

ADDENDUM F

WASHINGTON COUNTY

1 APR 29 1938
•CTSZJ
CIERX
DEPUTY
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs •

SPECIAL VERDICT
Civil No. 85-0535

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,
Defendant

We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled matter,
find, by the agreement of at least six of our number:
l.Did defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements
between the narties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the
agreements?
2.

YES

NO

If your answer to No. 1 is Y e s , what damages should be

awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wriaht as

3.

\

a result of tr--> br^?.ch?

Did Plaintiff Ceorge Ponald Wright breach the agreements

between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrell Humphries as
employee under the Management Agreement?

YES A

MO

an

4.

If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be

awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach?

* /5^<r —5.

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements

in any other respect?
6.

YES X

MO

If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should he the amount

of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of
*• h a t b r e a c ^ ?

7.

*

{(j

{'

Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of

the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF X
8.
in excess

Under the agreements, who was to pay the accounts payable
of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF

9.

DEFENDANTS

DEFENDANTS X

Under the agreements, who was to receive the accounts

receivable owed to Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF X
10.

DEFENDANTS

Under the terms of the agreements, between Plaintiff and

Defendant Darrel Humphries, who is obligated to pay the Promissory
Note in favor of Zions First National Rank in the sum of $15,000,
plus accrued interest, dated January 3, 1985.
PLAINTIFF
11.

DEFENDANT

X

As between Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Humphries, who

is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of Zions First

National Dank in the sun of $30,000, plus accrued interest, dated
December 1985?
PLAINTIFF
12.

X

DEFENDANT

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make fraudulent

misrepresentations concerning the value of the Weber County propert
YES A

to defendants?
13.

NO

If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, what amount o

damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Nursery and Darrel
ruirrhries for the difference in the actual fair market value of the
land in Weber County and the misrepresented value of that land?

34.

What is the amount of attorney's fee, if any, that

should be awarded to:
PLAINTIFF, GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT

%

/;

DEFENDANTS - WESTSIDE NURSERY
CC

%

AMD DARREL HUMPHRIES

/{.d,U^

THE APOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY.

DATED this 2C/

day of

It^-f^c

(L-

, 1980. 7f\>

,1

/
//,

Foreperson

•J

DISSENTING JURORS

By each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors
dissenting from that answer:
ANSWER
NUMBER

NAMES OF JURORS DISSENTING

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

1A.

-x.

,

_ .

— ^ — — :

ADDENDUM G

,-Jr;i

'C3 T/J3 3 Fl'l 1 05

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN [0607]
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendants
250 South Main
P. O. Box 726
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

DETU": . ^

<',-: <;

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

vs .
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

Civil No. 85-0536

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial pursuant to
notice duly given on April 25th, 1988, in the Washington County
Courthouse before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court
Judge presiding.

Present were Plaintiff George Ronald Wright,

and his counsel, Gary Pendleton.

Also present was Defendant

Darrel Humphries, general partner in Westside Nursery, a Utah
limited partnership and Darrel Humphries, an individual, and
their counsel, Hans Q. Chamberlain.
This matter has been the subject of prior orders which are
affirmed in this Judgment.
1.

These orders include:

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause

dated December 23rd, 1985.
2.

Temporary Restraining Order; Order Appointing Receiver;

..,#.Ai ^ A

Judgment; and Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment dated March

1

25th, 1986.

2

3..

Findings of Fact and Temporary Order dated July 2nd,

4.

Findings and Order dated November 10th, 1986.

1986.

The jury was empaneled and the parties proceeded to give
opening statements.
his case.

Plaintiff proceeded with the presentation of

Plaintiff rested.

Defendants thereafter presented

their case.
After the Defendants rested their case pursuant to their

10
11
12

counterclaim, Plaintiff moved for a dismissal or directed verdict
against Defendants1 counterclaim alleging fraud.
said argument, the same was denied by the Court.
Following the order of the Court entered denying Plaintiff's

13
14
15
16

After hearing

motion to dismiss, the

jury was called in and

instructed.

Arguments were made, and the matter was duly submitted to the
jury.

The jury returned a verdict as follows:

17
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

18

V7ASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

19
20

GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,

21
22
23
24
25

Plaintiff,
vs.
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,
Defendants.

BERLAIN
IGBEE
YS AT LAW
IUTH MAIN

SPECIAL VERDICT

Civil No. 85-0536

We the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter,

1

2

find, by the agreement of at least six of our number:
1.

Did Defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements

3

between the parties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the

A

agreements?
YES
2.

X

NO

If your answer to No. 1 is Yes, what damages should be

awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wright as a result of the
8

breach?

9
10

$
3.

6,805,00

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements

11

between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrel Humphries as

12

an employee under the Management Agreement?

13

YES

14
15

4.

18
19

NO

If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be

awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach?

16
17

X

$ 15,000.00
5.

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements

in any other respect?
6.

YES

X

NO

If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should be the

20

amount of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a

21

result of that breach?

22
23
24
25
3ERLAIN
IGBEE
VS AT LAW
UTH MAIN

7.

$

0

Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of

the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF

X

DEFENDANT

8.

Under the agreements, who was to pay the accounts

payable in excess of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF
9.

DEFENDANT

X

Under the agreements, who was to receive the accounts

receivable owed to Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF
10.

X

DEFENDANT

Under the terms of the agreements, between Plaintiff and

Defendant

Darrel

Humphries, who

is

obligated

to pay

the

Promissory Note in favor of Zions First National Bank in the sum
of $15,00C, plus accrued interest dated January 3, 1985.
PLAINTIFF
11.

DEFENDANT

X

As between Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Humphries, who

is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of Zions First
National Bank in the sum of $30,000, plus accrued interest, dated
December 1985?
PLAINTIFF
12.

DEFENDANT

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make

misrepresentations

concerning

fraudulent

the value of the Weber County

property to Defendants?
13.

X

YES

X

NO

If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, what amount of

damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Nursery and
Darrel Humphries for the difference in the actual fair market
value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented value of
that land?
14.

$ 38,582.00

What is the amount of attorney's fee, if any, that

should be awarded to:

A

PLAINTIFF GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT
1

DEFENDANTS WESTSIDE NURSERY and

2

DARREL HUMPHRIES

$ 10,000.00

3
THE ABOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY.
DATED this 30th day of April, 1988.

/s/ Clavton Prince
Foreperson

8
9
10

DISSENTING JURORS

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
JERLAIN
GBEE
'S AT LAW
JTH MAIN
BOX 72S

By each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors
dissenting from that answer:
ANSWER
NUMBER
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

NAMES OF JURORS DISSENTING

11.

1

12.

2

13.

3

14.

Vondell L. Barrick, Evon R. Seely

4
The Court made some inquiry of the jury concerning specific
findings.

Neither counsel requested that the jury be polled

after returning the verdict and the jury was then excused.
NOW, THEREFORE, based upon the findings of the jury and upon
9

applicable principles of law,

10

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

11

1.

Defendant Humphries

12

Plaintiff Judgment

13

follows:

14

A.

shall have and recover

against

in the amount of $20,198.21 computed

as

Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in the amount of

15

$37,305.21 as reimbursement for funds borrowed from Zions

16

First National Bank and deposited directly into the Westside

17

Nursery checking account.

18

entitled

19

reimbursement

20

Humphries from the Westside Nursery account for the payment

21

of personal obligations and $6,772.00 as reimbursement for

22

funds withdrawn

23

October 4th, 1985, for the purpose of paying accounts which

24

should have been assumed and discharged by Defendants.

25

cimounts specified herein constituting Plaintiff's right of

MBERLAIN
HIGBEE
NETS AT LAW
SOUTH MAIN

to

setoffs
for

in

monies

Against this sum, Plaintiff is
the

amount

of

misappropriated

$6,805.00
by

as

Defendant

from the Westside Nursery account after

The

setoff also includes interest which has been calculated at

1

the legal rate on the above-mentioned items from the date of

2

the misappropriation or expenditure.

3

2.

4

Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded

Judgment against Plaintiff for the difference in the actual fair
market value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented
value cf said land in the sum of $38,582.00.

The damages awarded

by the jury were calculated by the jury based on a fraudulent

8

misrepresentation concerning the value of the Weber property to

9

be $90,000.00, less the sum of $54,700.00 and less the real

10

estate commission Westside Nursery and Humphries had to pay in

11

selling the property of $3,282.00, thus totaling a difference of

12

$38,582.00.

13

twelve percent

14

will not award interest to Defendants on the sum of $38,582.00

15

from and after October 4th, 198 5 until time of Judgment, even

16

though requested to do so by Defendants.

17

3.

Said Judgment shall bear interest at the rate of
(12%) per annum until paid in full.

The Court

Plaintiff is not contractually bound to assume or

18

indemnify Defendant Humphries against any obligation in favor of

19

Zions First National Bank arising out of the execution of a

20

certain Promissory Note dated January 3rd, 198 5.

21

4

Defendants are obligated to pay and discharge all

22

accounts payable as of October 4th, 1985, t.< the extent that said

23

accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000.00 and are further obligated

24

to pay all outstanding tax obligations, federal, state or local,

25

accruing on or before October 4th, 1985.

ERLAIN
5BEE
5 AT LAW
TH MAIN

5.

Even though the jury found that Plaintiff breached the

1

agreements between the parties by terminating Defendant Humphries

2

as an employee under

3

Humphries damages in the sum of $15,000.00 by reason of the same,

the Management Agreement

and

awarded

the Court concludes and orders that Defendant Humphries' claim
for wrongful termination of the Management Agreement is dismissed
with prejudice, the jury's findings regarding specific issues of
fact establishing the defense of justification as a matter of
law.
6.

Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded

10

Judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 as and for

11

attorneyfs fees incurred in the prosecution of this action.

12

7.

13

awarded

14

$68,78 0.21, said Judgment to bear interest at the rate of twelve

15

percent (12%) per annum until paid in full.

16

Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery are therefore
a total Judgment

DATED this

V

—

against Plaintiff

day of

in the

sum of

, 1988

17
18

&4S-C4—

J/ PHILIP EVES
District Court Judge

19
20
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

GARY "W. PraCLETON
Attornev/xor PlaintL

ABERLAI
HIGBEE
IEYS
SOUTH

AT

LAW

MAIN

I

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
Jvttorney for Defendants

1
2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and

3

correct copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

4

to Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney at Law, 150 North Second East,
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage prepaid,
on this 5th day of August, 1988.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
BERLAIN
IIGBEE
:YS AT LAW
>UTH MAIN

/

6ecretary

/

-'

. -£<?£*<'
^

/

